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We present a new methodology for detecting faults and abnormal behavior in production plants.
The methodology stems from a joint project with a Danish energy consortium. During the course of
the project we encountered several problems that we believe are common for projects of this type.
Most notably, there was a lack of both knowledge and data concerning possible faults, and it there-
fore turned out to be infeasible to learn/construct a standard classiﬁcation model for doing fault
detection. As an alternative we propose a method for doing on-line fault detection using only a
model of normal system operation. Faults are detected by measuring the conﬂict between the model
and the sensor readings, and knowledge about the possible faults is therefore not required. We illus-
trate the proposed method using real-world data from a coal driven power plant as well as simulated
data from an oil production facility.
 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Alert systems; Bayesian networks; Conﬂict measure1. Introduction
Most production plants are equipped with sensors providing information to a control
room where operators monitor the production process. Based on skill and experience the
operators are alerted if something unusual happens, and through inspection of sensor0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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initiated.
In connection to a joint project with an energy consortium, we have been working on
establishing an alert system for a coal driven power plant. By an alert system we mean a
system that, based on sensor readings, raises a ﬂag in case of an abnormal situation. We
intended to base the system on a Bayesian network representation [19,13] of the power
plant, and to help us establish the model we had access to process engineers and an exten-
sive database of logged sensor data. However, during the course of the project we encoun-
tered several problems, which we believe are common for projects of this type:
(1) The engineers’ knowledge of the plant is not suﬃcient for providing a causal
structure.
(2) The production process is so complex that it is diﬃcult for the engineers to specify
the possible faults (abnormal situations) and, in particular, how these faults would
manifest themselves in the sensor readings.
(3) The time constants, describing the delay from event to eﬀect, are diﬃcult to
determine.
(4) Faults are so rare that statistics cannot be used to learn neither the structure nor the
parameters of a model of the faults.
(5) As there is a diﬀerence between a true value and its sensor reading, true values should
appear as hidden variables.
Faced with these problems, one approach would be to get as much causal structure
from the engineers as possible and to combine this information with a data driven learning
method. Unfortunately, state of the art of structural learning algorithms cannot cope with
domains with a massive set of hidden variables. Furthermore, due to the lack of know-
ledge about the possible faults it is not obvious how such a model should subsequently
be used for classifying abnormal behavior; as done in e.g., [4,18].
In this paper we propose an alternative methodology for on-line detection of abnormal
behavior in production systems. The method focuses on systems which are prone to the
problems described above, and it has the desirable property that it does not require infor-
mation about the possible faults nor a model of abnormal behavior. We illustrate the pro-
posed method using real-world data from the above mentioned power plant as well as
simulated data from an oil production facility.
2. The proposed methodology
As implied above, it is not obvious how to construct a classiﬁer (encoding the possible
faults) for detecting abnormal behavior; neither in the form of a causal model nor in the
form of e.g., a Naı¨ve Bayes model [9] or a tree augmented Naı¨ve Bayes model [10].
Instead, we propose to learn a Bayesian network representing normal operation only.
At each time step the model is used to calculate the probability of the set of sensor readings
for that time step. This probability is in turn used to evaluate whether the sensor readings
are jointly outside the scope of normal operation. That is, the proposed methodology con-
sists of two steps: (i) learning a model of the sensors for normal operation, and (ii) using
the learned model to monitor the system, initiate alerts and perform on-line diagnostics.
Models for describing normal operation has also been explored in the model-based
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ﬁrst-order logic), each component in the system is assigned a state (either normal or abnor-
mal) which is consistent with both the model and any observations made of the system.
2.1. Learning a model
The available database consists of sensor readings that have been logged during normal
system operation; each instance in the database can be seen as a ‘‘snapshot’’ of the overall
production process. In what follows we shall assume that the production process is com-
posed of a temporally ordered collection (C1,C2, . . . ,Cn) of components (or sub-pro-
cesses). The output of component Ci serves as input to component Ci+1, and (for ease
of exposition) each component, Ci, is assumed to be equipped with a single sensor, Si.
For instance, when tracking the coal in a power plant we can, at an abstract level, describe
the overall production process as being composed of three components: the silo, the coal
mill, and the furnace. Since the production process is a physical non-instantaneous process
we also have a delay (or time constant) associated with each of the components, i.e., the
time it takes for a particular unit (e.g., a piece of coal) to pass through.
Based on this perspective, we initially considered learning a model of the ﬂow of one
unit (e.g., coal) through the production plant. The variables in the learned model would
then represent the sensors in the system. One approach for learning such a model would
be to ﬁrst transform the original database s.t. a case in the transformed database would
correspond to the sensor readings related to one particular unit (this transformation is
illustrated in Table 1). However, making such a transformation requires information
about the time constants, which was unfortunately not available.
An alternative approach would be to learn a dynamic Bayesian network model directly
from the database by treating the cases as representing a trajectory through the systemTable 1
The original database is transformed s.t. each case in the resulting database contains the sensor readings related to
one particular unit in the system. We have assumed that the time delay between sensor S1 and S2 corresponds to
the sampling delay between case/snapshot c1 and cj in the original database
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Fig. 1. The ﬁgure illustrates a dynamic Bayesian network representation of the data generation process for a
production plant. The variable Si represents the sensor associated with component Ci, and the arcs going into a
sensor variable from a previous time slice models that the state of a sensor (correct, faulty or drifting) has an
impact on the next sensor reading.
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constants.
Instead, we used the database directly to learn a Bayesian network model over the
sensor variables. This approach, however, has a potential computational drawback in
the sense that we must expect the learned model to be very dense (this was also conﬁrmed
in the empirical experiments). If we had known the time constants we would also have
expected a dense model, albeit to a smaller degree. To see this, consider Fig. 1 which illus-
trates a simpliﬁed temporal causal model of the data generation process for a production
plant. Learning a model for the sensor variables can now conceptually be seen as learning
a model that describes the marginal distribution over the sensor variables Si in a time slice.
However, according to Fig. 1 we see that after very few time steps, each pair of variables in
a time slice are dependent no matter how we condition on the other variables in the time
slice. This is not only due to the hidden variables (modeling the components in the system),
but also because standard learning methods treat the cases as being independent [5]; the
latter corresponds to the past being unobserved.
2.2. Initiation of alerts
The sensor readings are received in a constant ﬂow, which is chopped up into time steps
of, say, 1 s. This means that for every second we have evidence consisting of a value for
each variable in the model.
Let the evidence be e = {e1, . . . ,en}, where ei is a sensor reading. We can now calculate
the conﬂict measure for the evidence [14] as
confðeÞ ¼ log P ðe1Þ  . . .  P ðenÞ
PðeÞ
 
:
Since the learned model represents normal system operation we would in general expect
that sensor readings recorded during normal operation are positively correlated (i.e., con-
f(e) 6 0) relative to the model. That is, for two sensor readings ei and ej we would expect
P(eijej) > P(ei), and therefore P(ei,ej) = P(eijej)P(ej) > P(ei)P(ej). Thus, when conf(e) > 0
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[16,15]. The conﬂict measure can also be interpreted as a soft measure of inconsistency: if a
case is inconsistent with the model, then it has probability 0, and if it is close to being
inconsistent then it has an unusual low probability; ‘‘unusual’’ is for this measure calcu-
lated relative to the model for complete independence. For the conﬂict measure above,
we expect a rather constant level for conf(Æ) under stable normal operation. When the
process is changed, and it transforms from one mode of normal operation to another,
we should expect oscillations in the conﬂict values until the changes have propagated
and resulted in a new stable mode of normal operation.
The probabilities P(ei) can be read directly from the Bayesian network in its initial state,
and it does not require any propagation. As all variables in the model are instantiated,
P(e) is also very easy to calculate: it is simply the product of the appropriate entries in
the conditional probability tables of the Bayesian network. No propagation is required,
i.e., the complexity is linear in the number of variables in the model.
As noted above, a positive conﬂict value is an indication of an abnormal situation. On
the other hand, a negative conﬂict value does not necessarily imply that we have a normal
situation as it may hide a serious conﬂict: if the sensors are strongly correlated during nor-
mal operation, the conﬂict level will be very negative, and a few conﬂicting sensor readings
may therefore not cause the entire conﬂict to be positive. This can also be seen from the
following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. Let ex ¼ fex1; . . . ; exng, ey ¼ fey1; . . . ; eymg, and e = ex [ ey. Then
confðeÞ ¼ confðex; eyÞ þ confðexÞ þ confðeyÞ;
where confðex; eyÞ ¼ log PðexÞPðey ÞPðeÞ
h i
.Proof
confðeÞ ¼ log P ðe
x
1Þ  . . .  P ðexnÞ  P ðey1Þ  . . .  P ðeymÞ
PðeÞ
 
¼ log P ðe
x
1Þ  . . .  P ðexnÞ  P ðey1Þ  . . .  P ðeymÞP ðexÞP ðeyÞ
PðeÞP ðexÞPðeyÞ
 
¼ log P ðe
xÞP ðeyÞ
P ðeÞ 
Pðex1Þ  . . .  P ðexnÞ
P ðexÞ 
P ðey1Þ  . . .  P ðeymÞ
P ðeyÞ
 
¼ confðex; eyÞ þ confðexÞ þ confðeyÞ: 
So, it may happen that ex and ey are internally so strongly correlated that they dominate a
conﬂict between the two sets. Thus, even when the conﬂict is negative, we shall watch out
for jumps in the conﬂict level that may indicate a potential abnormal situation.
When an alert has been triggered, the system can start tracing the source of the alert.
Various ways of tracing the conﬂict may be used. In our case we perform a greedy conﬂict
resolution: recursively remove the sensor reading that reduces the conﬂict the most, and
continue until the conﬂict is below a predeﬁned threshold. This procedure can be
performed very fast by exploiting fast retraction [7], lazy propagation [17] or arithmetic
circuits [6] as can be seen from the following proposition.
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x
the remaining evidence. Then
confðeÞ ¼ log P ðexÞ
P ðexjexÞ
 
þ confðexÞ:Proof
confðeÞ ¼ log P ðexÞP ðe1Þ  . . .  P ðenÞ
P ðeÞ
 
¼ log P ðexÞ
P ðexjexÞ 
P ðe1Þ  . . .  P ðenÞ
P ðexÞ
 
¼ log P ðexÞ
P ðexjexÞ
 
þ confðexÞ: 
That is, the reading with lowest normalized likelihood given the other readings contributes
the most to the conﬂict. Note that as the Markov blanket of X is instantiated, the calcu-
lation of P(exjex) can be performed locally.Algorithm 2.1 (Conflict resolution)
(1) Let t be a ‘‘conﬂict threshold’’ for when an alert should be initiated (e.g., t = 0).
(2) Let e be a set of conﬂicting sensor readings.
(3) Repeat
(a) Select
e0 ¼ argmax
e
log
P ðeÞ
P ðeje n fegÞ
 
:
(b) Set e := en{e 0}.
(4) Until conf(e) < t.It should be emphasized that as evidence is retracted during conﬂict resolution, we will
in general need to perform standard probability updating when calculating the probabil-
ities required for Step 3a and Step 4.3. Empirical results
The proposed methodology has been tested on real-world data from a coal based power
plant as well as simulated data from an oil production facility. In the latter case the data
was generated based on a model that includes the dynamics of the facility as well as con-
trol loops.3.1. Power plant data
We received data about the power plant under normal system operation with load aver-
age 90–100%, i.e., the power plant operated between 90% and 100% of its full capacity.
The data set contains 9600 cases, and each case consists of 87 simultaneous observations
Fig. 2. The network learned from the power plant data.
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distinct coal mills powering a turbine, thereby providing a natural partitioning of the
observations into ﬁve disjoint sets: for each coal mill there are 12 distinct observations,
and 35 observations summarize general properties of the power plant (the remaining 4
observations can be derived from the other observations, and they are therefore redun-
dant). The cases do not only contain actual sensor values, but they also include soft
sensors, i.e., artiﬁcial ‘‘sensors’’ that have been computed based on the values of other sen-
sors, as well as set-points and other indirect signals. Unfortunately, as the domain experts
could not provide information for distinguishing between the observations, they were all
treated similarly.
As a preprocessing step, all data sets were naively discretized using equal width binning,
where the number of bins were chosen (based on several tests) to be 3. Based on the pre-
processed data, we learned a Bayesian network model for a single coal mill as described in
Section 2.1; the actual learning was performed using the software tool PowerConstructor
with a 0.1-threshold for the conditional independence tests [2,3]. In the learned model, six
variables turned out to be completely independent of the other variables and they were
therefore removed together with the redundant observations (see Fig. 2). It should be
emphasized that the learned model is only used as a factorization of the joint probability
distribution and should not be subject to interpretation from e.g., a causal point of view.
One part of the model stands out, though, namely the node cluster consisting of V261 Since each case contains sensors readings for a particular point in time, the database can also be interpreted as
a sequence of ‘‘snapshots’’ of the plant.
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tion in the coal, and the nodes that appear as children of V26 can, except for one node, be
partitioned into two disjoint subsets with distinct semantics: 10 nodes correspond to sen-
sors which either directly or indirectly measures the volume/pressure and temperature of
the air that is used for drying the coal, and 4 nodes correspond to sensors related to the
load average of the plant and which are therefore closely related to the water concentra-
tion in the coal.
Finally, it should be noted that since the database is complete, the parameters of the
model could simply be estimated using frequency counts.
In addition to the data sets for normal system operation, we received three data sets
that each contained 1441 cases. Two of the data sets covered actual errors/abnormal sit-
uations whereas the last represented an ‘‘unusual behavior’’ that it would be interesting to
detect:
• The fall-pipe leading coal into the power plant becomes clogged.
• A temperature sensor becomes faulty.
• A large load change (from 60–75% to 90–100%) occurs while the water concentration in
the coal is high, thereby making it diﬃcult to regulate the production process.
We have tested the proposed methodology by simulating on-line performance using the
‘‘clogged fall-pipe’’ data set as well as the ‘‘faulty-sensor’’ data set. Both tests were
performed ‘‘blind-folded’’, i.e., we ﬁrst analyzed the data and then, after the analysis,
we discussed our ﬁndings with the domain experts.
A plot of the conﬂict measures for the ‘‘clogged fall-pipe’’ data set is depicted in Fig. 3.
From the plot we see that we have positive conﬂict measures from observation 1136 and
forward, i.e., the conﬂict measures indicate that the system makes a transition from a
normal to an abnormal system state at 1136. This is also consistent with the information
provided to us, namely that the system entered an abnormal state (the fall-pipe became
clogged) between 1100 and 1144. Another interesting aspect of the plot is the ﬂuctuations-80
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Fig. 3. The left-hand ﬁgure shows a plot of the conﬂict measure for each case in the ‘‘clogged fall-pipe’’ data set; a
value above 0 indicates a conﬂict. Note how the conﬂict measure is aﬀected by the load-change and the fall-pipe
becoming clogged. To reduce the noise in the data, the right-hand ﬁgure shows the 0.9 percentile of the last 30
cases.
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Fig. 4. A plot of the conﬂict measure for each case in the ‘‘faulty-sensor’’ data set; a value above 0 indicates a
conﬂict. Note how the conﬂict measure is aﬀected by the load-changes and the drop in temperature. The right-
hand ﬁgure shows the 0.9 percentile of the last 30 cases.
T.D. Nielsen, F.V. Jensen / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 45 (2007) 255–270 263in the conﬂict measure that appears around observation 700 and lasts until approximately
780. We were later told that in this interval the system actually made a short change in
load average from 99% to 84% and then back again.
When performing conﬂict resolution, the algorithm indicates that the sensor measuring
the water-percentage in the coal can explain all the conﬂicts. Ideally, we would have liked
the system to pinpoint that the fall-pipe is clogged. However, since this is not part of the
vocabulary provided by the model we interpret the result as indicating that there is an
inconsistency in the energy balance of the system, and that this inconsistency can best
be explained by the water percentage in the coal; this was also consistent with the analysis
by the engineers.
A similar test was made on the ‘‘faulty sensor’’ data set, where the conﬂict measures can
be seen in Fig. 4. As suggested by the plot, the conﬂict measure indicates that the system
entered the abnormal state prior to the ﬁrst observation; this was later conﬁrmed by the
engineers. We were also informed that in the beginning of the data set and around obser-
vation 600, there were two quick changes in the load averages (from 90–100% to 80% and
back again); these changes are reﬂected as quick changes in the calculated conﬂict mea-
sures. Finally, we were told that around observation 600 the temperature drops from
100 C to 90 C (at which level it stays for the remaining observations). Observe, that
around this observation we also see a permanent drop in the conﬂict measure that seems
to stabilize around observation 1100.
When performing conﬂict resolution we found that after observation 600, there were six
signiﬁcant sensors that could explain the conﬂict. We were informed that four of the sen-
sors were actually signiﬁcant for this scenario, but that the other two ‘‘sensors’’ should not
have been picked out since they were set-points rather than sensors. However, the identi-
ﬁcation of these sensors actually makes sense as there is a conﬂict between the system sen-
sors and the set-points.
Finally, we have made a tentative analysis of the ‘‘production regulation’’ data set. A
diﬃculty with this data set is that the learned model only covers normal operation during
load average 90–100%. Hence, we have only considered the observations made after the
load change has been completed. For the resulting data set the distinguishing characteris-
tic is that the coal has a high water concentration, which made it diﬃcult to regulate the
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Fig. 5. A plot of the conﬂict measure for the ‘‘production regulation’’ data set after the change has taken eﬀect.
The system is correctly classiﬁed as not being in an abnormal state. The right-hand ﬁgure shows the 0.9 percentile
of the last 30 cases.
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should be classiﬁed as being abnormal, but rather an unusual system state that it would be
interesting to detect (in case it would eventually result in an abnormal state). Fig. 5 shows
a plot of the conﬂicts after observation 550 where the load change has been completed.
As can be seen from the ﬁgure, the conﬂict values are all below 0 (except for a few single
cases). This is consistent with the system not being in an abnormal state. However, from
the measurements we can also see that the average conﬂict value is higher than for normal
operation: For the ‘‘production regulation’’ data set, the average conﬂict value is 7.44,
but during normal operation in the ‘‘clogged-fall-pipe’’ data set the average conﬂict value
is between 10.34 and 22.8 with an average of 19.96. That is, you may be able to dis-
criminate between diﬀerent types of normal system operation by also considering the value
of the conﬂict measure and not only whether it is positive or negative.
3.2. Oil production data
We have received a database with 10,000 simulated cases for normal system operation
for an oil production facility; each case in the database covers 140 sensors with white noise
added to the sensor values.3 The database was generated from a temporal causal model,
which also simulated standard process variations. Hence, the database shares the same
characteristics w.r.t. learning as the power plant database (see Section 2.1). All of the sen-
sor values appeared as real-valued output, so as a preprocessing step all variables/sensors
were discretized. The actual discretization was performed using cross-validation to ﬁnd the
number of bins (with a maximum of 5) that maximizes the estimated likelihood of the
data; the actual discretization was performed using Weka [22].
In order to test the proposed methodology in this setting, we used two other data sets
both containing 10,000 cases. The ﬁrst data set was generated by simulating faults in the
pumping system whereas the second data set was generated by simulating faults in the
cooling system (see also Table 2).2 The actual diﬃculty is caused by the system not being able to dry the coal during a load average of 90–100%.
3 Similar to the power plant database, the database can be interpreted as a sequence of ‘‘snapshots’’ of the
facility.
Table 2
The table summarizes the changes in the production process for the ‘‘Pump’’ data set and the ‘‘Cooling’’ data set,
respectively. Note: The changes in the two scenarios are initiated at the same points in time
Time ‘‘Pump’’ data set ‘‘Cooling’’ data set
30 Small leak in the pump Small external leak in the cooling system
1500 Large leak in the pump Large external leak in the cooling system
3000 Normal operation Normal operation
3500 Small degradation of motor eﬃciency Small internal leak in the cooling system
5000 Large degradation of motor eﬃciency Large internal leak in the cooling system
6500 Normal operation Normal operation
7000 Small degradation of pump eﬃciency Moderate fouling
8500 Large degradation of pump eﬃciency Signiﬁcant fouling
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previous section, Fig. 6(b) shows the 0.9-percentile over the last 30 cases. The vertical lines
in the two plots correspond to the points in time where changes are initiated (see Table 2).
As can be seen from Fig. 6, there are signiﬁcant changes in the conﬂict measure at time
1500, 3000, 5000, 6500 and 8500, which either correspond to large errors in system oper-
ation or changes back to normal system operation. From Table 2 we see that the changes
appearing at 30, 3500 and 7000 correspond to small errors in the system operation and,
accordingly, they are also less apparent in the plots. In particular, the change appearing
at 3500 occurs before the system has settled into stationary normal system operation.
A similar plot of the conﬂict measure for the ‘‘Cooling’’ data set is given in Fig. 7(a).
Analogously to the previous data set, there is a signiﬁcant change in the conﬂict measure
for all errors except at time 30, 3500 and 7000.
Note that the conﬂict measures for both databases are all negative, which is a conse-
quence of the decomposition property (Proposition 2.1) as discussed in Section 2.2. Thus,
in order to perform conﬂict resolution the conﬂict threshold (see Algorithm 2.1) should be
speciﬁed based on the values observed during normal operation. Moreover, in order to
detect changes in system operation we need to track jumps in the conﬂict measure.-80
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Fig. 6. The left-hand ﬁgure shows a plot of the conﬂict measure for each case in the ‘‘Pump’’ data set. The vertical
lines indicate when a change in the production process is initiated as speciﬁed in Table 2. The ﬁgure to the right
shows the 0.9 percentile of the last 30 cases.
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Fig. 7. The ﬁgure to the left shows a plot of the conﬂict measure for each case in the ‘‘Cooling’’ data set. The
vertical line indicates when a change in the production process is initiated as speciﬁed in Table 2. The right-hand
ﬁgure shows the 0.9 percentile of the last 30 cases.
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In order to track the changes in the conﬂict measure we have applied a method related
to the work by Yamanishi and TakeUchi [23], and which can be seen as an extension of the
method presented in Section 2.2. Speciﬁcally, we assume that under normal system oper-
ation the conﬂict values can (approximately) be seen as independent samples from a nor-
mal distribution with ﬁxed mean and variance. Under this assumption we can model the
lth conﬂict value as a random variable with a normal distribution, f, where the mean ll and
the variance r2l are estimated as the sample mean and sample variance of the last m obser-
vations (also called the relevant history):
l^l ¼ xl;m ¼ 1m
Xm
j¼1
xlj; r^2l ¼
1
m
Xm
j¼1
ðxlj  xl;mÞ2:
Thus, an immediate approach for detecting a change point could be to calculate the log-
arithmic loss for the last n observations (xi+1, . . . ,xi+n), and then raise an alert in case the
value is above a predeﬁned threshold:
log2f ðxiþ1; . . . ; xiþnjx1; . . . ; xiÞ ¼ 
Xn
j¼1
log½f ðxiþjjl^iþj; r^2iþjÞ > d:
This approach, however, is very sensitive to ﬂuctuations in the conﬂict value (thereby pro-
ducing false alerts), and it has a diﬃculty in detecting drifts in the conﬂict measure. To
alleviate these two problems, we instead compare the model above with another model
f 0, where the mean and the variance are estimated without taking the last s observations
into account. That is, the relevant history, used to estimate l and r2, is shifted s observa-
tions back:
l^0i ¼
1
m
Xm
j¼1
xijs; r^02i ¼
1
m
Xm
j¼1
ðxijs  xis;mÞ2:
The models are compared by evaluating the diﬀerence in log-likelihood of the models
given the last n observations (also called the score diﬀerence):
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f ðxiþ1; . . . ; xiþnjl^i; r^2i Þ
f 0ðxiþ1; . . . ; xiþnjl^0i; r^02i Þ
 
:
Note that Df ;f 0 should not be considered a conﬂict measure as in Section 2.2, but rather a
score for comparing two competing models for normal operation. In particular, during
normal operation we would expect the score to be within an interval [d:d], and for actual
change points we would expect D > d. The value of d inﬂuences the ratio of false positives
and false negatives and could, e.g., be chosen based on the conﬂict values observed during
normal/stable system operation. The value of n determines the response time of the sys-
tem, but by choosing the value of n too small we risk having the score dominated by ran-
dom ﬂuctuations.
To test the method, we ﬁrst simulated on-line fault detection using the conﬂict values
produced by the ‘‘clogged fall-pipe’’ data set. A plot of Df ;f 0 using n = 5 (the number of
conﬂict values used to compare the models) m = 5 (the size of the relevant history) and
s = 20 (the number of conﬂict values ignored in the second model) is shown in
Fig. 8(a). Fig. 8(b) shows another example with n = m = 10 and s = 40. In both plots
we have an increase in Df ;f 0 when the load-average changes (around observation 600)
and when the fall-pipe becomes clogged (around observation 1100). The changes in Df ;f 0
appearing around observation 200 are caused by the relative large ﬂuctuations in the con-
ﬂict values occurring after intervals with zero variance. Unfortunately we have not been
able to identify the source of these ﬂuctuations.
We have performed similar tests for the ‘‘faulty sensor’’ data set as shown in Fig. 9. As
described previously, for this data set the system had entered an abnormal system state
already prior to the ﬁrst observation. This is also reﬂected in the score diﬀerence, which
is less stable than for the ‘‘clogged fall-pipe’’ data set. Most signiﬁcantly, though, are
the two peaks corresponding to the two changes in load average, as well as the peaks that
occur around observation 1100, where the system appears to stabilize after the tempera-
ture drop.
For the oil production data, the detection of change points is obscured by the relative
large amount of noise in the system. Fig. 10 shows the score diﬀerence for the ‘‘Pump’’
data set using (m = 15, n = 15, s = 45) and (n = 20, m = 20, s = 50), respectively. In the
ﬁrst test, the change points caused by the small degradations in the production process-1000
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Fig. 8. The left-hand ﬁgure shows a plot of Df ;f 0 (with n = m = 5 and s = 20) for the conﬂict values produced by
the ‘‘clogged fall-pipe’’ data set. The right-hand ﬁgure shows a similar plot, but with n = m = 10 and s = 40.
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Fig. 10. The left-hand ﬁgure shows a plot of Df ;f 0 for the conﬂict measure produced by the ‘‘Pump’’ data set with
n = m = 15 and s = 45. The right-hand ﬁgure shows a similar plot, but with n = m = 20 and s = 50.
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Fig. 9. The ﬁgure shows the score diﬀerence for the faulty sensor data set using m = n = 10 and s = 25.
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and the number of discarded samples. Our experiments indicate that the parameter values
governing change point detection have a signiﬁcant impact on the score diﬀerence as well
as the response time of the system. However, a more formal analysis is outside the scope of
this paper.
4. Conclusion and future work
We have proposed an alert system methodology based on conﬂict analysis. A distin-
guishing characteristic of the proposed methodology is that it only relies on a model for
normal system operation, i.e., knowledge about the possible faults is not required. More-
over, the computational complexity of the algorithm ensures that on-line analysis is feasi-
ble. The methodology has been successfully tested on both real-world data from a power
plant and simulated data from an oil production facility.
As part of ongoing research and future work, we are working on establishing alterna-
tive straw models in order to perform a more reﬁned conﬂict analysis; see also the discus-
sion in [16,15] concerning the independence straw model [14]. Having an alternative straw
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sors’ impact on the conﬂict measure is dominated by strongly correlated sensors. More-
over, it could also be interesting to consider alternative types of models for normal
operation. For example, instead of looking for a general Bayesian network model, which
tends to become very dense, we might focus on a restricted subclass of models, such as the
Naı¨ve Bayes models [16]. In addition, rather than discretizing the sensor values one could
also try to learn a model with continuous variables using e.g., mixtures of truncated expo-
nentials [21].
In the process of ﬁnishing the paper, we became aware of the work recently published
by Ibargu¨engoytia et al. [12]. Ibargu¨engoytia et al. [12] take outset in the related ﬁeld of
sensor validation, where they use Bayesian networks for representing normal sensor oper-
ation. However, instead of using conﬂict measures for detecting faults they compare the
actual sensor readings with the expected sensor readings; a discrepancy between these val-
ues is then interpreted as a possible fault. A more thorough comparison is outside the
scope of the present paper and is subject to future research.
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